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Abstract
Social networks on the Internet have seen an enormous growth recently and play a crucial
role in different aspects of today’s life. They have facilitated information dissemination in ways
that have been beneficial for their users but they are often used strategically in order to spread
information that only serves the objectives of particular users. These properties have inspired a
revision of classical opinion formation models from sociology using game-theoretic notions and
tools. We follow the same modeling approach, focusing on scenarios where the opinion expressed
by each user is a compromise between her internal belief and the opinions of a small number of
neighbors among her social acquaintances. We formulate simple games that capture this behavior
and quantify the inefficiency of equilibria using the well-known notion of the price of anarchy. Our
results indicate that compromise comes at a cost that strongly depends on the neighborhood size.
1. Introduction
Opinion formation has been the subject of much research in sociology, economics, physics, and
epidemiology. Due to the widespread adoption of the Internet and the subsequent blossoming of
social networks, it has recently attracted the interest of researchers in AI (e.g., see Auletta et al.
[2016], Schwind et al. [2015], Tsang and Larson [2014]) and CS at large (e.g., see Bindel et al.
[2015], Mossel and Tamuz [2014], Olshevsky and Tsitsiklis [2009]) as well.
An influential model that captures the adoption of opinions in a social context has been pro-
posed by Friedkin and Johnsen [1990]. According to this, each individual has an internal belief on
an issue and publicly expresses a (possibly different) opinion; internal beliefs and public opinions
are modeled as real numbers. In particular, the opinion that an individual expresses follows by aver-
aging between her internal belief and the opinions expressed by her social acquaintances. Recently,
Bindel et al. [2015] show that this behavior can be explained through a game-theoretic lens: aver-
aging between the internal belief of an individual and the opinions in her social circle is simply a
strategy that minimizes an implicit cost for the individual.
Bindel et al. [2015] use a quadratic function to define this cost. Specifically, this function is
equal to the total squared distance of the opinion that the individual expresses from her belief and
the opinions expressed in her social circle. In a sense, this behavior leads to opinions that follow
the majority of her social acquaintances. Bindel et al. [2015] consider a static snapshot of the social
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of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 142-148, 2017. This work was
partially supported by COST Action CA 16228 “European Network for Game Theory” and by a PhD scholarship
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network. In contrast, Bhawalkar et al. [2013] implicitly assume that the opinion of an individual
depends on a small number of acquaintances only, her neighbors. So, in their model, opinion
formation co-evolves with the neighborhood for each individual: her neighborhood consists of those
who have opinions similar to her belief. Then, the opinion expressed is assumed to minimize the
same cost function used by Bindel et al. [2015], taking into account the neighborhood instead of the
whole social circle.
We follow the co-evolutionary model of Bhawalkar et al. [2013], but we deviate from their cost
definition and instead consider individuals that seek to compromise with their neighbors. Hence, we
assume that each individual aims to minimize the maximum distance of her expressed opinion from
her belief and each of her neighbors’ opinion. Like Bhawalkar et al. [2013], we assume that opinion
formation co-evolves with the social network. Each individual’s neighborhood consists of the k
other individuals with the closest opinions to her belief. Naturally, these modeling decisions lead
to the definition of strategic games, which we call k-compromising opinion formation (or, simply,
k-COF) games. Each individual is a (cost-minimizing) player with the opinion expressed as her
strategy.
1.1 Technical contribution
We study questions related to the existence, computational complexity, and quality of equilibria in
k-COF games. We begin by proving several properties about the geometric structure of opinions
and beliefs at pure Nash equilibria, i.e., in states of the game where each player minimizes her
individual cost assuming that the remaining players will not change their opinions, and, thus, has
no incentive to deviate by expressing a different opinion.
Using these structural properties we show that there exist simple k-COF games that do not
admit pure Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we prove that even in games where equilibria do exist,
their quality may be suboptimal in terms of the social cost, i.e., the total cost experienced by all
players. To quantify this inefficiency, we show that the optimistic measure known as the price of
stability (introduced by Anshelevich et al. [2008]) which, informally, is defined as the ratio of the
minimum social cost achieved at any pure Nash equilibrium to the minimum social cost at any
possible state of the game, grows linearly with k.
For the special case of 1-COF games, we show that each such game admits a representation as
a directed acyclic graph, in which every pure Nash equilibrium corresponds to a path between two
designated nodes. Hence, the problems of computing the best or worst (in terms of the social cost)
pure Nash equilibrium (or even of computing whether such an equilibrium exists) are equivalent to
simple path computations that can be performed in polynomial time.
For general k-COF games, we quantify the inefficiency of the worst-case pure Nash equi-
libria by bounding the pessimistic measure known as the price of anarchy (introduced by
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999]) which, informally, is defined as the ratio of the maximum
social cost achieved at any pure Nash equilibrium to the minimum possible social cost at any state
of the game. Specifically, we present upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy of k-COF
games (with respect to both pure and mixed Nash equilibria) that suggest a linear dependence on k.
Our upper bound on the price of anarchy exploits, in a non-trivial way, linear programming duality
in order to lower-bound the optimal social cost. For the fundamental case of 1-COF games, we
obtain a tight bound of 3 using a particular charging scheme in the analysis. Our contribution is
summarized in Table 1.
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k PoA MPoA PoS Existence/Complexity
1 3 (Thms 19, 20) ≥ 6 ≥ 17/15 PNE may not exist for any k (Thm. 6)
(Thm. 21) (Thm. 8) Best and worst PNE is in P (Thm. 10)
2 ≤ 12 (Thm. 12) ≥ 24/5 ≥ 8/7 Open question: Is computing a PNE
≥ 18/5 (Thm. 22) (Thm. 23) (Thm. 9) in P when k ≥ 2?
≥ 3 ≤ 4(k + 1) (Thm. 12) ≥ k + 2 ≥ k+13
≥ k + 1 (Thm. 22) (Thm. 23) (Thm. 7)
Table 1: Summary of our results for k-COF games. The table presents our bounds on the price
of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria (PoA) and mixed Nash equilibria (MPoA), on the price of
stability (PoS) as well as the existence and complexity of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). Clearly, any
upper bound on PoA is also an upper bound on PoS.
1.2 Related work
DeGroot [1974] proposed a framework that models the opinion formation process, where
each individual updates her opinion based on a weighted averaging procedure. Subsequently,
Friedkin and Johnsen [1990] refined the model by assuming that each individual has a private be-
lief and expresses a (possibly different) public opinion that depends on her belief and the opinions
of people to whom she has social ties. More recently, Bindel et al. [2015] studied this model and
proved that, for the setting where beliefs and opinions are in [0, 1], the repeated averaging pro-
cess leads to an opinion vector that can be thought of as the unique equilibrium in a corresponding
opinion formation game.
Deviating from the assumption that opinions depend on the whole social circle, Bhawalkar et al.
[2013] consider co-evolutionary opinion formation games, where as opinions evolve so does the
neighborhood of each person. This model is conceptually similar to previous ones that have been
studied by Hegselmann and Krause [2002], and Holme and Newman [2006]. Both Bindel et al.
[2015] and Bhawalkar et al. [2013] show constant bounds on the price of anarchy of the games
that they study. In contrast, the modified cost function we use in order to model compromise yields
considerably higher price of anarchy.
A series of recent papers from the EconCS community consider discrete models with binary
opinions. Chierichetti et al. [2018] consider discrete preference games, where beliefs and opinions
are binary and study questions related to the price of stability. For these games, Auletta et al. [2015,
2017b] characterize the social networks where the belief of the minority can emerge as the opinion
of the majority, while Auletta et al. [2017a] examine the robustness of such results to variants of the
model. Auletta et al. [2016] generalize discrete preference games so that players are not only inter-
ested in agreeing with their neighbors and more complex constraints can be used to represent the
players’ preferences. Bilo` et al. [2016] extend co-evolutionary formation games to the discrete set-
ting. Other models assume that opinion updates depend on the entire social circle of each individual,
who consults a small random subset of social acquaintances; see the recent paper by Fotakis et al.
[2016] and the survey of Mossel and Tamuz [2014].
When there are more than one issues to be discussed, Jia et al. [2015] propose and analyze the
DeGroot-Friedkin model for the evolution of an influence network between individuals who form
opinions on a sequence of issues, while Xu et al. [2015] introduce a modification to the DeGroot-
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Friedkin model so that each individual may recalculate the weight given to her opinion, i.e., her
self-confidence, after the discussion of each issue.
Another line of research considers how fast a system converges to a stable state. In this spirit,
Etesami and Basar [2015] consider the dynamics of the Hegselmann-Krause model [2002], where
opinions and neighborhoods co-evolve, and study the termination time in finite dimensions under
different settings. Similarly, Ferraioli et al. [2016] study the speed of convergence of decentralized
dynamics in finite opinion games, where players have only a finite number of opinions available.
Ferraioli and Ventre [2017] consider the role of social pressure towards consensus in opinion games
and provide tight bounds on the speed of convergence for the important special case where the social
network is a clique.
Das et al. [2014] perform a set of online user studies and argue that widely studied theoretical
models do not completely explain the experimental results obtained. Hence, they introduce an
analytical model for opinion formation and present preliminary theoretical and simulation results
on the convergence and structure of opinions when users iteratively update their respective opinions
according to the new model.
Chazelle [2012] analyzes influence systems, where each individual observes the location of her
neighbors and moves accordingly, and presents an algorithmic calculus for studying such systems.
Kempe et al. [2016] present a novel model of cultural dynamics and study the interplay between se-
lection and influence. Their results include an almost complete characterization of stable outcomes
and guaranteed convergence from all starting states. Gomez-Rodriguez et al. [2012] consider net-
work diffusion and contagion propagation. Their goal is to infer an unknown network over which
contagion propagated, tracing paths of diffusion and influence. Finally, Kempe et al. [2015] study
the optimization problem for influence maximization in a social networks, where each individual
may decide to adopt an idea or an innovation depending on how many of her neighbors already do.
The goal is to select an initial seed set of early adopters so that the number of adopters is maximized.
In spite of the extensive related literature on opinion formation in many different disciplines,
our model introduces a novel cost function that, we believe, captures the tendency of individuals to
compromise more accurately.
1.3 Roadmap
We begin with preliminary definitions and notation in Section 2. Then, in Section 3 we present
several structural properties of pure Nash equilibria, while Section 4 is devoted to the existence
and the price of stability of these equilibria. In Section 5, we present an algorithm that determines
whether pure Nash equilibria exist in a 1-COF game, and, in addition, computes the best and worst
such equilibria, when they exist. In Sections 6 and 7 we prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy
of k-COF and 1-COF games, respectively, while Section 8 contains our lower bounds. We conclude
in Section 9 with a discussion of open problems and possible extensions of our work.
2. Definitions and notation
A compromising opinion formation game defined by the k nearest neighbors (henceforth, called
k-COF game) is played by a set of n players whose beliefs lie on the line of real numbers. Let
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ R
n be the vector containing the players’ beliefs such that si ≤ si+1 for each
i ∈ [n− 1]. Let z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) ∈ R
n be a vector containing the (deterministic or randomized)
opinions expressed by the players; these opinions define a state of the game. We denote by z−i the
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opinion vector obtained by removing zi from z. In an attempt to simplify notation, we omit k from
all relevant definitions.
Given vector z (or a realization of it in case z contains randomized opinions), we define the
neighborhood Ni(z, s) of player i to be the set of k players whose opinions are the closest to the
belief of player i breaking ties arbitrarily (but consistently). For each player i, we define Ii(z, s) as
the shortest interval of the real line that includes the following points: the belief si, the opinion zi,
and the opinion zj for each player j ∈ Ni(z, s). Furthermore, let ℓi(z, s) and ri(z, s) be the players
with the leftmost and rightmost point in Ii(z, s), respectively. For example, ℓi(z, s) can be equal
to either player i or some player j ∈ Ni(z, s), depending on whether the leftmost point of Ii(z, s)
is si, zi, or zj . To further simplify notation, we will frequently use ℓ(i) and r(i) instead of ℓi(z, s)
and ri(z, s) when z and s are clear from the context. In the following, we present the relevant
definitions for the case of possibly randomized opinion vectors; clearly, these can be simplified
whenever z consists entirely of deterministic opinions.
Given a k-COF game with belief vector s, the cost that player i experiences at the state of the
game defined by an opinion vector z is
E[costi(z, s)] = E
[
max
j∈Ni(z,s)
{
|zi − si|, |zj − zi|
}]
= E
[
max
{
|zi − si|, |zri(z,s) − zi|, |zi − zℓi(z,s)|
}]
. (1)
For the special case of 1-COF games, we denote by σi(z, s) (or σ(i) when z and s are clear from
the context) the player (other than i) whose opinion is closest to the belief si of player i; notice that
σ(i) is the only member of Ni(z, s). In this case, the cost of player i can be simplified as
E[costi(z, s)] = E
[
max
{
|zi − si|, |zσi(z,s) − zi|
}]
. (2)
We say that an opinion vector z consisting entirely of deterministic opinions is a pure Nash
equilibrium if no player i has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to a deterministic opinion z′i in
order to decrease her cost, i.e.,
costi(z, s) ≤ costi((z
′
i, z−i), s),
where by (z′i, z−i) we denote the opinion vector in which player i chooses the opinion z
′
i and all
other players choose the opinions they have according to vector z. Similarly, a possibly randomized
opinion vector z is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for any player i and any deviating deterministic
opinion z′i we have
E[costi(z, s)] ≤ Ez−i [costi((z
′
i, z−i), s)].
Let PNE(s) and MNE(s) denote the sets of pure and mixed Nash equilibria, respectively, of the
k-COF game with belief vector s.
The social cost of an opinion vector z is the total cost experienced by all players, i.e.,
E[SC(z, s)] =
n∑
i=1
E[costi(z, s)].
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Let z∗(s) be a deterministic opinion vector that minimizes the social cost for the given k-COF game
with belief vector s; we will refer to it as an optimal opinion vector for s.
The price of anarchy (PoA) over pure Nash equilibria of a particular k-COF game with belief
vector s is defined as the ratio between the social cost of its worst (in terms of the social cost) pure
Nash equilibrium and the optimal social cost, i.e.,
PoA(s) = sup
z∈PNE(s)
SC(z, s)
SC(z∗(s), s)
.
The price of stability (PoS) over pure Nash equilibria of the k-COF game with belief vector s is
defined as the ratio between the social cost of the best pure Nash equilibrium (in terms of social
cost) and the optimal social cost, i.e.,
PoS(s) = inf
z∈PNE(s)
SC(z, s)
SC(z∗(s), s)
.
Similarly, the price of anarchy and the price of stability over mixed Nash equilibria of a k-COF
game with belief vector s are defined as
MPoA(s) = sup
z∈MNE(s)
E[SC(z, s)]
SC(z∗(s), s)
and
MPoS(s) = inf
z∈MNE(s)
E[SC(z, s)]
SC(z∗(s), s)
,
respectively.
Then, the price of anarchy and the price of stability of k-COF games, for a fixed k, are defined
as the supremum of PoA(s) and PoS(s) over all belief vectors s, respectively.
We conclude this section with an example.
Example 1. Consider the 1-COF game with three players and belief vector s = (−10, 2, 5) which
is depicted in Figure 1(a). For simplicity, we will refer to the players as left (ℓ), middle (m), and
right (r).
Let us examine the opinion vector z = (−10,−5, 4) which is depicted in Figure 1(b). We have
that σ(ℓ) = m since the opinion zm = −5 of the middle player is closer to the belief sℓ = −10 of
the left player than the opinion zr = 4 of the right player. Therefore, the cost of the left player is
costℓ(z, s) = max{| − 10 + 10|, | − 10 + 5|} = 5. Similarly, the neighbors of the middle and right
players are σ(m) = r and σ(r) = m, while their costs are costm(z, s) = max{2 + 5, 4 + 5} = 9
and costr(z, s) = max{5− 4, 4 + 5} = 9, respectively. The social cost is SC(z, s) = 23.
Now, consider the alternative pure Nash equilibrium opinion vector z′ = (−3.5, 3, 4) which is
depicted in Figure 1(c). Observe that even though z′ 6= z, each player has the same neighbor as in
z and no player has an incentive to deviate in order to decrease her cost. Indeed, let us focus on the
middle player for whom it is σ(m) = r. Her opinion is in the middle of the interval defined by her
belief sm = 3 and the opinion z
′
r = 5 of the right player. Hence, this opinion minimizes her cost by
minimizing the maximum between the distance from her belief and the distance from the opinion
of the right player. It is easy to verify that the same holds for the left and right players. The player
costs are now 6.5, 1, and 1, respectively, yielding a social cost of 8.5.
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[1]
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[1]
(a)
−10 2 5−5 4
(b)
−10 2 5−3.5 3 4
(c)
Figure 1: The game examined in Example 1. (a) Illustration of the belief vector s = (−10, 2, 5). The
black squares correspond to player beliefs. The notation [x] is used to denote the number of players
that have the same beliefs; here we have only one player per belief. (b) Illustration of the opinion
vector z = (−10,−5, 4). The dots correspond to player opinions and each arrow connects the belief
of a player to her opinion. (c) Illustration of the equilibrium opinion vector z′ = (−3.5, 3, 4).
3. Some properties about equilibria
We devote this section to proving several some interesting properties of pure Nash equilibria; these
will be useful in the following. The first one is obvious due to the definition of the cost function.
Lemma 1. In any pure Nash equilibrium z of a k-COF game with belief vector s, the opinion of
any player i lies in the middle of the interval Ii(z, s).
The next lemma allows us to argue about the order of player opinions in a pure Nash equilibrium
z.
Lemma 2. In any pure Nash equilibrium z of a k-COF game with belief vector s, it holds that
zi ≤ zi+1 for any i ∈ [n− 1] such that si < si+1.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that zi+1 < zi for a pair of players i and i+1with
si < si+1. Then, it cannot be the case that the leftmost endpoint of the interval Ii(z, s) of player i is
at the left of (or coincides with) the leftmost endpoint of interval Ii+1(z, s) of player i+ 1 and the
rightmost endpoint of Ii(z, s) is at the left of (or coincides with) the rightmost endpoint of Ii+1(z, s).
In other words, it cannot be the case thatmin{si, zℓ(i)} ≤ min{si+1, zℓ(i+1)} andmax{si, zr(i)} ≤
max{si+1, zr(i+1)} hold simultaneously. Since, by Lemma 1, points zi and zi+1 lie in the middle
of the corresponding intervals, we would have zi ≤ zi+1, contradicting our assumption.
So, at least one of the two inequalities between the interval endpoints above must not hold. In the
following, we assume that min{si, zℓ(i)} > min{si+1, zℓ(i+1)} (the case where max{si, zr(i)} >
max{si+1, zr(i+1)} is symmetric). This assumption implies that zℓ(i+1) < si < si+1 (i.e.,
min{si+1, zℓ(i+1)} = zℓ(i+1)), and, subsequently, that zℓ(i+1) < zℓ(i). In words, player ℓ(i + 1)
does not belong to interval Ii(z, s). Furthermore, since zℓ(i+1) < si+1, and as (by Lemma 1) zi+1
lies in the middle of Ii+1(z, s), we also have that the leftmost endpoint of interval Ii+1(z, s) cannot
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belong to player i+ 1, i.e., ℓ(i+ 1) 6= i+ 1. An example of the relative ordering of points (beliefs
and opinions), after assuming that zi+1 < zi andmin{si, zℓ(i)} > min{si+1, zℓ(i+1)} is depicted in
Figure 2.
zℓ(i+1) zℓ(i) si zi+1 zi si+1
Ii+1(z, s) · · ·
Ii(z, s) · · ·
Figure 2: An example of the argument used in the proof of Lemma 2.
Since ℓ(i+1) does not belong to Ii(z, s), there are at least k players different than ℓ(i+1) and i
that have opinions at distance at most si−zℓ(i+1) from belief si. Since si < si+1 and zℓ(i+1) < zℓ(i),
all these players are also at distance strictly less than si+1−zℓ(i+1) from belief si+1. This contradicts
the fact that the opinion of player ℓ(i+ 1) is among the k closest opinions to si+1.
In the following, in any pure Nash equibrium z, we assume that zi ≤ zi+1 for any i ∈ [n − 1].
This follows by Lemma 2 when si < si+1 and by a convention for the identities of players with
identical belief.
In addition to the ordering of opinions in a pure Nash equilibrium, we can also specify the range
of neighborhoods (in Lemma 3) and opinions (in Lemma 4).
Lemma 3. Let z be a pure Nash equilibrium of a k-COF game with belief vector s. Then, for each
player i, there exists j with i− k ≤ j ≤ i such that Ii(z, s) is the shortest interval that contains the
opinions zj , zj+1, ..., zj+k and belief si.
Proof. If Ii(z, s) consists of a single point, the lemma follows trivially by the definition of the
neighborhood and Lemma 2 since at least k+1 consecutive players including i should have opinions
in Ii(z, s). Otherwise, by Lemma 2, the lemma is true if there is at most one opinion in each of
the left and the right boundary of Ii(z, s); in this case, there are exactly k + 1 consecutive players
including player i with opinions in Ii(z, s).
In the following, we handle the subtleties that may arise due to tie-breaking at the boundaries
of Ii(z, s). Let Yℓ and Yr be the set of players with opinions at the leftmost and the rightmost point
of Ii(z, s), respectively. From Lemma 1, player i belongs neither to Yℓ nor to Yr. Now consider the
following set of players: the |Yℓ ∩Ni(z, s)| players with highest indices from Yℓ, the |Yr ∩Ni(z, s)|
players with lowest indices from Yr and all players with opinions that lie strictly in Ii(z, s). Due to
the definition of Ni(z, s) and by Lemma 2, there are k + 1 players in this set, including player i,
with consecutive indices.
In the following, irrespectively of how ties are actually resolved, we assume that Ni(z, s) ∪ {i}
consists of k + 1 players with consecutive indices. This does not affect the cost of player i at
equilibrium in the proofs of our upper bounds (since, by Lemma 3, the interval defined is exactly
the same), while our lower bound constructions are defined carefully so that the results hold no
matter how ties are actually resolved.
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Lemma 4. Let z be a pure Nash equilibrium of a k-COF game with belief vector s. Then, for each
player i, it holds that sℓ(i) ≤ zi ≤ sr(i).
Proof. Since Ni(z, s)∪{i} consists of k+1 players with consecutive indices, we have that sℓ(i) ≤
si ≤ sr(i). For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that sℓ(i) ≤ sr(i) < zi for some player i
(the case where zi lies at the left of sℓ(i) is symmetric). Since sr(i) < si and as zi is at the middle
of Ii(z, s), it holds that zr(i) > zi (i.e., r(i) 6= i). Also, since zr(i) > zi > sr(i), and because zr(i)
is in the middle of Ir(i)(z, s), it holds that zr(r(i)) > zr(i) and, by Lemma 2, r(r(i)) > r(i); see
Figure 3 for an example of the relative ordering of points (beliefs and opinions) when assuming that
sr(i) < zi.
sℓ(i) si sr(i) zi zr(i) zr(r(i))
Ir(i)(z, s)· · ·
Figure 3: An example of the argument used in the proof of Lemma 4.
We now claim that ℓ(i) /∈ Nr(i)(z, s). Assume otherwise that ℓ(i) ∈ Nr(i)(z, s). By definition,
r(r(i)) ∈ Nr(i)(z, s). Then, Lemma 2 implies that any player j, different than r(i), with ℓ(i) < j <
r(r(i)) is also inNr(i)(z, s). Hence,Nr(i)(z, s) contains at least the k−1 players inNi(z, s)\{r(i)},
as well as players i and r(r(i)). This, however, contradicts the fact that |Nr(i)(z, s)| = k. Therefore,
player ℓ(i) is not among the k nearest neighbors of r(i).
So, we obtain that
zr(r(i)) − sr(i) > zr(i) − sr(i) > zr(i) − zi = zi −min{si, zℓ(i)}
> sr(i) −min{si, zℓ(i)} ≥ sr(i) − zℓ(i).
If zℓ(i) > sr(i) (i.e, zℓ(i) is at the right of sr(i)), then since, by Lemma 2, zℓ(i) ≤ zr(r(i)) and
r(r(i)) ∈ Nr(i)(z, s), we obtain that ℓ(i) ∈ Nr(i)(z, s) as well; a contradiction. Otherwise, the
above inequality yields that zr(r(i))− sr(i) > sr(i)− zℓ(i) ≥ 0 (i.e., the distance of sr(i) from zr(r(i))
is strictly higher than the distance of sr(i) from zℓ(i)), and, again, we obtain a contradiction to the
fact that ℓ(i) /∈ Nr(i)(z, s) and r(r(i)) ∈ Nr(i)(z, s).
4. Existence and quality of equilibria
Our first technical contribution is a negative statement: pure Nash equilibria may not exist for any
k (Theorem 6). Then, we show that even in k-COF games that admit pure Nash equilibria, the best
equilibrium may be inefficient; in other words, the price of stability is strictly greater than 1 for any
value of k, and, actually, depends linearly on k. These results appear in Theorems 7, 8, and 9.
4.1 Existence of equilibria
We begin with a technical lemma. The lemma essentially presents necessary conditions so that a
particular set of neighborhoods, and corresponding intervals, may coexist in a pure Nash equilib-
rium.
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Lemma 5. Consider a k-COF game and any three players a, b, c with beliefs sa ≤ sb ≤ sc,
respectively. For any pure Nash equilibrium z where Ia(z, s) = [sa, zb], Ib(z, s) = [sb, zc] and
Ic(z, s) = [zb, sc], it must hold that sb ≥
3sa+5sc
8 , while for any pure Nash equilibrium z where
Ia(z, s) = [sa, zb], Ib(z, s) = [za, sb] and Ic(z, s) = [zb, sc], it must hold that sb ≤
5sa+3sc
8 .
Proof. It suffices to prove the first case; the second case is symmetric. Since Ib(z, s) = [sb, zc] and
Ic(z, s) = [zb, sc], by Lemma 1 it holds that zb = (sb + zc)/2 and zc = (zb + sc)/2 which yield
that zb = sb +
sc−sb
3 and zc = sb +
2(sc−sb)
3 . Hence, we obtain that
zc − sb =
2(sc − sb)
3
. (3)
Similarly, since Ia(z, s) = [sa, zb], it holds that za =
sa+zb
2 =
3sa+2sb+sc
6 and, therefore, we obtain
that
sb − za =
−3sa + 4sb − sc
6
. (4)
Since Ib(z, s) = [sb, zc], we have that a /∈ Nb(z, s) and, subsequently, that zc−sb ≤ sb−za which,
together with (3) and (4), yields that sb ≥
3sa+5sc
8 as desired.
The proof of the next theorem is inspired by a construction of Bhawalkar et al. [2013] and
exploits Lemma 5.
Theorem 6. For any k, there exists a k-COF game with no pure Nash equilibria.
Proof. Consider a k-COF game with 2k + 1 players partitioned into three sets called L,M , and R,
where L and R each contain k players, while M = {m} is a singleton. We set si = 0 for each
i ∈ L, si = 2 for each i ∈ R, while sm = 1 − ǫ, where ǫ < 1/4 is an arbitrarily small positive
constant.
Let us assume that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium z. Then, clearly, for any i ∈ L it must
hold that Ni(z, s) = L \ {i} ∪ {m}, and, therefore, Ii(z, s) = [0, zm]. Similarly, for any i ∈ R
we have Ni(z, s) = R \ {i} ∪ {m}, and Ii(z, s) = [zm, 2]. Now, concerning player m, if all her
neighbors are in L, then, it holds that Im(z, s) = [zi, sm] for some i ∈ L. But then, observe that
even though the intervals defined above exhibit the structure described in Lemma 5, the belief vector
s does not satisfy the corresponding necessary conditions of that lemma as 1− ǫ > 3/4; hence, z is
not a pure Nash equilibrium. The same reasoning applies in case all ofm’s neighbors are in R.
It remains to consider the case where m has at least one neighbor in each of L and R. By the
definition of Ii(z, s) for i ∈ L ∪ R, as stated above, Lemma 1 implies that zi = zm/2 for any
i ∈ L, while zi = 1 + zm/2 for any i ∈ R. Then, Lemma 4 implies that zm/2 ≤ sm = 1 − ǫ and
1 + zm/2 ≥ sm, and, consequently, Im(z, s) = [zm/2, 1 + zm/2]. Again, by Lemma 1 we have
that zm =
zm/2+1+zm/2
2 , i.e., zm = 1. But then, we obtain zi = 1/2 for any i ∈ L and zi = 3/2 for
any i ∈ R, which implies that all k players in L are strictly closer to sm than any player in R; this
contradicts the assumption thatm has neighbors in both L and R.
An example of the construction used in the proof of Theorem 6 is presented in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: (a) The k-COF game considered in the proof of Theorem 6 where the k players of set
L have belief 0, player m has sm = 1 − ǫ and the k players of set R have belief 2. (b) Lemma 5
implies that there is no pure Nash equilibrium wherem has neighbors in strictly one of L, R. In the
remaining case, it must hold that x = 1, but then all players in L are strictly closer to sm than any
player in R.
4.2 Price of stability
We will now prove that the price of stability of k-COF games is strictly higher than 1, i.e., there
exist games without any efficient pure Nash equilibria (even when they exist). In particular, for any
value of k we show that there exist rather simple games with price of stability in Ω(k).
Theorem 7. The price of stability of k-COF games, for k ≥ 3, is at least (k + 1)/3.
Proof. Consider a k-COF game with k + 1 players, where k of them have belief 0, while the
remaining one has belief 1. Let z˜ be the opinion vector where each player has opinion 0. Clearly,
SC(z˜, s) = 1, and, hence the optimal social cost is at most 1.
Now, consider any pure Nash equilibrium z. Since, there are k+1 players, the neighborhood of
each player includes all remaining ones. Let x be the opinion that the player with belief 1 expresses
at z. By Lemma 4, we have that x ∈ [0, 1], and by Lemma 1, we have that all remaining players
must have opinion x/2. Therefore, again by Lemma 1, xmust satisfy the equation x = (1+x/2)/2,
i.e., x = 2/3. Therefore, there exists a single pure Nash equilibrium z where all players with belief
0 have opinion 1/3 and the single player with belief 1 has opinion 2/3, and we obtain SC(z) =
(k + 1)/3 which implies the theorem.
Clearly, the above result states the inefficiency of the best pure Nash equilibrium only when
k ≥ 3. For the remaining cases where k ∈ {1, 2} we present slightly more complicated instances,
where the proofs rely on Lemma 5. Recall that, for 1-COF games, σ(i) denotes the single neighbor
of player i.
Theorem 8. The price of stability of 1-COF games is at least 17/15.
Proof. We use the following 1-COF game with six players and belief vector
s = (0, 5 − 3λ, 8, 15, 18 + 3λ, 23),
where λ ∈ (0, 1/4).
Consider the opinion vector
z˜ = (3− λ, 6− 2λ, 7− 6λ, 16 + 6λ, 17 + 2λ, 20 + λ).
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It can be easily seen that it has social cost SC(z˜, s) = 10 + 12λ. So, clearly, SC(z∗, s) ≤ 10 + 12λ
for any optimal opinion vector z∗.
Now, consider the opinion vector
z =
(
5− 3λ
3
,
10− 6λ
3
,
31
3
,
38
3
,
59 + 6λ
3
,
64 + 3λ
3
)
with social cost SC(z, s) = 34/3 − 4λ. It is not hard to verify (by showing, as Lemma 1 requires,
that each opinion lies in the middle of its player’s interval) that z is a pure Nash equilibrium; we
argue that this equilibrium is unique.
We claim that, by Lemma 5, there cannot be a pure Nash equilibrium where both σ(j − 1) = j
and σ(j +1) = j for any j ∈ {2, 5}. To see this, assume otherwise and note that the corresponding
intervals satisfy the conditions of the lemma. However, by observing the belief vector s, it holds that
5sj−1+3sj+1
8 < sj <
3sj−1+5sj+1
8 , for j ∈ {2, 5}, i.e., s does not satisfy the conditions of Lemma 5;
this contradicts our original assumption.
The above observation, together with Lemma 2, implies that σ(1) = 2, σ(3) = 4, σ(4) = 3 and
σ(6) = 5 in any equilibrium. This leaves only σ(2) ∈ {1, 3} and σ(5) ∈ {4, 6} undefined.
Consider an equilibrium z′ with σ(2) = 3; the case σ(5) = 4 is symmetric. Since σ(3) = 4,
Lemma 4 implies that z′3 > s3 = 8 and, hence
z′3 − s2 > 3 + 3λ. (5)
Since σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 3 and z′1 =
s1+z′2
2 , Lemma 4 implies that z
′
2 > s2 and we obtain that
z′1 >
5−3λ
2 and, hence,
s2 − z
′
1 <
5− 3λ
2
. (6)
By inequalities (5) and (6), we get z′3 − s2 > s2 − z
′
1, which contradicts our assumption that
σ(2) = 3. So, it must hold that σ(2) = 1 (and, respectively, σ(5) = 6) which implies that z is the
unique pure Nash equilibrium.
We conclude that the price of stability is lower-bounded by
SC(z, s)
SC(z∗, s)
=
34/3 − 4λ
10 + 12λ
,
and the theorem follows by taking λ to be arbitrarily close to 0.
Theorem 9. The price of stability of 2-COF games is at least 8/7.
Proof. Consider a 2-COF game with four players a, b, c, and d, with belief vector s = (0, 1, 1, 2).
Let z˜ = (1, 1, 1, 3/2) be an opinion vector and observe that SC(z˜, s) = 3/2; note that z˜ is not a
pure Nash equilibrium as player a has an incentive to deviate. Clearly, the optimal social cost is at
most 3/2.
Now consider any pure Nash equilibrium z. By the structural properties of equilibria,
Na(z, s) = Nd(z, s) = {b, c}, while b ∈ Nc(z, s) and c ∈ Nb(z, s). It remains to argue about
the second neighbor of b and c. We distinguish between two cases depending on whether b and c
have a common second neighbor in {a, d} or not.
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In the first case, let a be the common neighbor; the case where d is that neighbor is symmetric.
By Lemma 1, we have that zb = zc = (1 + za)/2. Then, we have that Ia(z, s) = [0, zb], Ib(z, s) =
[za, 1], and Id(z, s) = [zb, 2]. Note that by applying Lemma 5 on players a, b, and d, we obtain a
contradiction to the fact that z is a pure Nash equilibrium.
In the second case, without of loss of generality, let Nb(z, s) = {a, c} and Nc(z, s) = {b, d}
which, by Lemma 4, imply that zb ∈ [0, 1] and zc ∈ [1, 2]. Then, Lemma 1 yields za = zc/2,
zb = (za + zc)/2, zc = (zb + zd)/2, and zd = 1 + zb/2. By solving this system of equations, we
obtain that z = (4/7, 6/7, 8/7, 10/7) and, hence, SC(z) = 12/7.
5. Complexity of equilibria
In this section we focus entirely on 1-COF games. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that
determines whether such a game admits pure Nash equilibria, and, in case it does, allows us to
compute the best and worst pure Nash equilibrium with respect to the social cost. We do so by
establishing a correspondence between pure Nash equilibria and source-sink paths in a suitably
defined directed acyclic graph. See Example 2 below for an instance execution of the following
procedure.
Assume that we are given neighborhood information according to which each player i has either
player i−1 or player i+1 as neighbor. From Lemma 3, such a neighborhood structure is necessary
in a pure Nash equilibrium. We claim that this information is enough in order to decide whether
there is a consistent opinion vector that is a pure Nash equilibrium or not. All we have to do is to
use Lemma 1 and obtain n equations that relate the opinion of each player to her belief and her
neighbor’s opinion. These equations have a unique solution which can then be verified whether it
indeed satisfies the neighborhood conditions or not. So, the main idea of our algorithm is to cleverly
search among all possible neighborhood structures that are not excluded by Lemma 3 for one that
defines a pure Nash equilibrium.
For integers 1 ≤ a ≤ b < c ≤ n, let us define the segment C(a, b, c) to be the set of players
{a, a + 1, ..., c} together with the following neighborhood information for them: σ(p) = p+ 1 for
p = a, ..., b and σ(p) = p − 1 for p = b + 1, ..., c. It can be easily seen that the neighborhood
information for all players at a pure Nash equilibrium can always be decomposed into disjoint
segments. Importantly, given the neighborhood information in segment C(a, b, c) and the beliefs of
its players, the opinions they could have in any pure Nash equilibrium that contains this segment
are uniquely defined using Lemma 1. In particular, the opinions of the players within a segment
C(a, b, c) are computed as follows. First, we set zb = sb +
sb+1−sb
3 and zb+1 = sb +
2(sb+1−sb)
3 .
Then, we set zp =
sp+zp+1
2 if a ≤ p < b, and zp =
sp+zp−1
2 if b < p ≤ c.
We remark that the opinion vector implied by a segment is not necessarily consistent to the
given neighborhood structure. So, we call segment C(a, b, c) legit if a 6= 2, c 6= n−1 (so that it can
be part of a decomposition) and the uniquely defined opinions are consistent to the neighborhood
information of the segment, i.e., if |zσ(p)−sp| ≤ |zp′−sp| for any pair of players p, p
′ (with p 6= p′)
in C(a, b, c). This process appears in Algorithm 1.
A decomposition of neighborhood information for all players will consist of consecutive seg-
ments C(a1, b1, c1), C(a2, b2, c2), ..., C(at, bt, ct) so that a1 = 1, ct = n, aℓ = cℓ−1 + 1 for
ℓ = 2, ..., t. Such a decomposition will yield a pure Nash equilibrium if it consists of legit segments
and, furthermore, the uniquely defined opinions of players in consecutive segments are consistent
to the neighborhood information.
13
In particular, consider the directed graph G that has two special nodes designated as the source
and the sink, and a node for each legit segment C(a, b, c). Note thatG hasO(n3) nodes. The source
node is connected to all segment nodes C(1, b, c) while all segment nodes C(a, b, n) are connected
to the sink. An edge from segment node C(a, b, c) to segment node C(a′, b′, c′) exists if a′ = c+ 1
and the uniquely defined opinions of players in the two segments are consistent to the neighborhood
information in both of them. This consistency test has to check
1. whether the leftmost opinion za′ in segment C(a
′, b′, c′) is indeed further away from the belief
sc of player c than the opinion zc−1 of the designated neighbor of c in segment C(a, b, c), i.e.,
|zc−1 − sc| ≤ |za′ − sc|, and whether
2. whether the rightmost opinion zc in segment C(a, b, c) is further away from the belief sa′ of
player a′ than the opinion za′+1 of the designated neighbor of a
′ in segment C(a′, b′, c′), i.e.,
|za′+1 − sa′ | ≤ |zc − sa′ |.
By the definition of segments and of its edges, G is acyclic. This process appears in Algorithm 2.
Based on the discussion above, there is a bijection between pure Nash equilibria and source-sink
paths in G. In addition, we can assign a weight to each node of G that is equal to the total cost of
the players in the corresponding segment, i.e.,
weight(C(a, b, c)) =
∑
a≤p≤c
|zp − sp|.
Then, the total weight of a source-sink path P is equal to the social cost of the corresponding pure
Nash equilibrium, i.e,
SC(z, s) =
∑
C(a,b,c)∈P
weight(C(a, b, c)).
Hence, standard algorithms for computing shortest or longest paths in directed acyclic graphs
can be used not only to detect whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists, but also to compute the
equilibrium of best or worst social cost.
Theorem 10. Given a 1-COF game, deciding whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists can be done
in polynomial time. Furthermore, computing a pure Nash equilibrium of highest or lowest social
cost can be done in polynomial time as well.
Example 2. Consider a 1-COF game with four players with belief vector s = (0, 9, 12, 21). Accord-
ing to the discussion above, there are 10 segments of the form C(a, b, c) with 1 ≤ a ≤ b < c ≤ 4,
but it can be shown that only 3 of them are legit; these are C(1, 1, 2), C(3, 3, 4) (see Figure 5a),
and C(1, 2, 4) (see Figure 5b). For example, segment C(1, 1, 4), in which σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 1,
σ(3) = 2, and σ(4) = 3, corresponds to the opinion vector (3, 6, 9, 15). This is not consistent to
the neighborhood information σ(2) = 1 in the segment, as the belief of player 2 coincides with the
opinion of player 3, while the opinion of player 1 is further away. The resulting directed acyclic
graph G (see Figure 5c) implies that there exist two pure Nash equilibria for this 1-COF game,
namely the opinion vectors (3, 6, 15, 18) and (5, 10, 11, 16).
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Algorithm 1: Segment
Input: belief vector s = (s1, ..., sn), parameters a, b, and c such that a ≤ b < c
Output: opinion vector za:c = (za, ..., zc), segment weight, legit indicator
legit := 0
if a 6= 2 or c 6= n− 1 then
legit := 1
zb := sb +
1
3(sb+1 − sb)
zb+1 := sb +
2
3(sb+1 − sb)
for p := b− 1 downto a do
zp :=
1
2(sp + zp+1)
end
for p := b+ 2 to c do
zp :=
1
2(sp + zp−1)
end
for p := a+ 1 to b do
if |zp−1 − sp| < |zp+1 − sp| then
legit := 0
end
end
for p := b+ 1 to c− 1 do
if |zp+1 − sp| < |zp−1 − sp| then
legit := 0
end
end
weight := 0
for p := a to c do
weight := weight + |zp − sp|
end
end
return [za:c, weight, legit]
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Algorithm 2: ConstructGraph
Input: belief vector s = (s1, ..., sn)
Output: a node-weighted directed acyclic graph G
V := ∅
for a := 1 to n− 1 do
for b := a to n− 1 do
for c := b+ 1 to n do
[za:c, weight, legit] := Segment(s, a, b, c)
if legit = 1 then
C.a = a, C.b = b, C.c = c, C.za:c = za:c, C.weight = weight
V := V ∪ C
end
end
end
end
V := V ∪ {source, sink}
E := ∅
for C ∈ V do
if C.a = 1 then
E := E ∪ (source, C)
else if C.c = n then
E := E ∪ (C, sink)
end
end
for all segment pairs (C,D) such that D.a = C.c+ 1 do
if |C.zc−1 − sC.c| ≤ |D.za − sC.c| and |D.za+1 − sD.a| ≤ |C.zc − sD.a| then
E := E ∪ (C,D)
end
end
return G = (V,E)
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Figure 5: The 1-COF game considered in Example 2. (a) The legit segments C(1, 1, 2) and
C(3, 3, 4) which imply the opinion vector (3, 6, 15, 18). (b) The legit segment C(1, 2, 4) which
implies the opinion vector (5, 10, 11, 16). (c) The directed acyclic graph G which shows that there
exist two pure Nash equilibria in the game.
6. Upper bounds on the price of anarchy
In this section we prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy of k-COF games. In our proof, we
relate the social cost of any deterministic opinion vector, including optimal ones, to a quantity that
depends only on the beliefs of the players and can be thought of as the cost of the truthful opinion
vector (in which the opinion of every player is equal to her belief). In particular, we prove a lower
bound on the optimal social cost (in Lemmas 11) and an upper bound on the social cost of any pure
Nash equilibrium, both expressed in terms of this quantity. The bound on the price of anarchy then
follows by these relations; see the proof of Theorem 12.
Consider an n-player k-COF game with belief vector s = (s1, ..., sn). For player i, we denote by
ℓ∗(i) and r∗(i) the integers in [n] such that ℓ∗(i) ≤ i ≤ r∗(i), r∗(i)− ℓ∗(i) = k, and |sr∗(i)− sℓ∗(i)|
is minimized. The proof of the next lemma exploits linear programming and duality.
Lemma 11. Consider a k-COF game with belief vector s = (s1, ..., sn) and let z be any determin-
istic opinion vector. Then,
SC(z, s) ≥
1
2(k + 1)
n∑
i=1
|sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)|.
Proof. Consider any deterministic opinion vector z and let π be a permutation of the players so that
zπ(j) ≤ zπ(j+1) for each j ∈ [n − 1]. We refer to player π(j) as the player with rank j.
1 For
each player i, we will identify an effective neighborhood Fi(z, s) that consists of k+1 players with
consecutive ranks and includes player i. Define ℓ˜(i) and r˜(i) to be the players in Fi(z, s) with the
1. Note that we have proved monotonicity of opinions for pure Nash equilibria only (Lemma 2) and it is not clear
whether such a monotonicity property holds for opinion vectors of minimum social cost. In addition, the statement
of Lemma 11 refers to any opinion vector. This clearly includes non-monotonic ones, so we need to rank players in
terms of opinions in the proof.
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lowest and highest belief, respectively. In the extreme case where all players in Fi(z, s) have the
same belief, we let ℓ˜(i) and r˜(i) be the players with the lowest and highest ranks, respectively. The
effective neighborhood will be defined in such a way that it satisfies the properties costi(z, s) ≥
zr˜(i) − zi and costi(z, s) ≥ zi − zℓ˜(i).
Let Ni(z, s) denote the neighborhood of player i, i.e., the set of players (not including i) with
the k closest opinions to the belief si of player i. Let Ji(z, s) be the smallest contiguous interval
containing all opinions of players inNi(z, s)∪{i} and letDi(z, s) be the set of players with opinions
in Ji(z, s). Clearly, |Di(z, s)| ≥ k + 1. We define Fi(z, s) to be a subset of Di(z, s) that consists
of k + 1 players with consecutive ranks including player i. See Figure 6 for an illustrative example
of all quantities defined above.
s1 z4 s2 z1 z3 s3 z2 s4z6 s5 s6 z5
Figure 6: An example of the quantities used in the proof of Lemma 11. Let k = 2 and i = 4. Then,
the neighborhood of player 4 is N4(z, s) = {2, 6}, the smallest contiguous interval containing the
opinions of players in N4(z, s) ∪ {4} is J4(z, s) = [z4, z6], the set of players with opinions in
J4(z, s) isD4(z, s) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}, the effective neighborhood is F4(z, s) = {1, 3, 4}, and, hence,
ℓ˜(4) = 1, and r˜(4) = 4.
Let ℓ′(i) and r′(i) be the players in Ni(z, s) with the leftmost and rightmost opinion. In order
to show that the definition of Fi(z, s) satisfies the two desired properties, we distinguish between
three different cases depending on the location of opinion zi among the players in Ni(z, s) ∪ {i}.
• Case I: Player i has neither the leftmost nor the rightmost opinion in Ni(z, s) ∪ {i}, i.e.,
zℓ′(i) < zi < zr′(i).
2 In this case, Ji(z, s) = [zℓ′(i), zr′(i)]. Then, the definition of Ni(z, s)
implies that costi(z, s) ≥ zr′(i)−zi and costi(z, s) ≥ zi−zℓ′(i). Hence, costi(z, s) ≥ |zj−zi|
for every zj ∈ Ji(z, s) or, equivalently, j ∈ Di(z, s) and, subsequently, for each j ∈ Fi(z, s).
This implies the two desired properties costi(z, s) ≥ zr˜(i) − zi and costi(z, s) ≥ zi − zℓ˜(i).
• Case II: Player i has the leftmost opinion inNi(z, s) ∪ {i}, i.e., zi ≤ zℓ′(i). Then, Ji(z, s) =
[zi, zr′(i)]. Now, the definition of Ni(z, s) implies that costi(z, s) ≥ zr′(i) − zi and, hence,
costi(z, s) ≥ |zj−zi| for every zj ∈ Ji(z, s) or, equivalently, j ∈ Di(z, s) and, subsequently,
for each j ∈ Fi(z, s). Again, this implies the two desired properties.
• Case III: Player i has the rightmost opinion inNi(z, s)∪{i}, i.e., zi ≥ zr′(i). Then, Ji(z, s) =
[zℓ′(i), zi]. Now, the definition of Ni(z, s) implies that costi(z, s) ≥ zi − zℓ′(i) and, hence,
costi(z, s) ≥ |zj−zi| for every zj ∈ Ji(z, s) or, equivalently, j ∈ Di(z, s) and, subsequently,
for every j ∈ Fi(z, s). Again, the two desired properties follow.
By setting the variable ti equal to costi(z, s) for i ∈ [n], the discussion above and the fact that
costi(z, s) ≥ |si − zi| imply that the opinion vector z together with t = (t1, . . . , tn) is a feasible
2. Case I cannot appear when k = 1.
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solution to the following linear program:
minimize
∑
i∈[n]
ti
subject to ti + zi ≥ si,∀i ∈ [n]
ti − zi ≥ −si,∀i ∈ [n]
ti + zi − zr˜(i) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [n] such that r˜(i) 6= i
ti + zℓ˜(i) − zi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [n] such that ℓ˜(i) 6= i
ti, zi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [n]
Using the dual variables αi, βi, γi, and δi associated with the four constraints of the above LP,
we obtain its dual LP:
maximize
∑
i∈[n]
siαi −
∑
i∈[n]
siβi
subject to αi + βi + γi · 1{r˜(i) 6= i}+ δi · 1{ℓ˜(i) 6= i} ≤ 1,∀i ∈ [n]
αi − βi + γi · 1{r˜(i) 6= i} − δ(i) · 1{ℓ˜(i) 6= i} −
∑
j 6=i:r˜(j)=i
γj
+
∑
j 6=i:ℓ˜(j)=i
δj ≤ 0,∀i ∈ [n]
αi, βi, γi, δi ≥ 0
The indicator 1{X} is equal to 1 when the condition X is true, and 0 otherwise. We will show that
the solution defined as
αi =
|{j ∈ [n] : r˜(j) = i}|
2(k + 1)
,
βi =
|{j ∈ [n] : ℓ˜(j) = i}|
2(k + 1)
,
γi = δi =
1
2(k + 1)
,
is a feasible dual solution. Indeed, to see why the first dual constraint is satisfied, first observe that
player i belongs to at most 2k + 1 different effective neighborhoods. Hence, player i can have the
lowest or highest belief among the players in the effective neighborhood of at most 2k + 1 players
(implying that αi+βi ≤ 1−
1
2(k+1) ) when r˜(i) = i or ℓ˜(i) = i and of at most 2k players (implying
that αi + βi ≤ 1−
1
k+1 ) when r˜(i) 6= i and ℓ˜(i) 6= i. The first constraint follows.
It remains to show that the second constraint is satisfied as well (with equality). We do so by
distinguishing between three cases:
• When r˜(i) 6= i and ℓ˜(i) 6= i, the dual solution guarantees that αi =
∑
j 6=i:r˜(j)=i γj and
the term αi in the left-hand side of the second constraint cancels out with the sum of γ’s.
Similarly, βi =
∑
j 6=i:ℓ˜(j)=i δj and the term βi cancels out with the sum of δ’s. Also, the
terms γi and δi are both equal to
1
2(k+1) and cancel out as well.
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• When r˜(i) = i (then, clearly, ℓ˜(i) 6= i), we have that αi = δi · 1{ℓ˜(i) 6= i} +
∑
j 6=i:r˜(j)=i γj
(cancelling out the first, fourth and fifth terms) and βi =
∑
j 6=i:ℓ˜(j)=i δj (cancelling out the
second and sixth terms), and the second constraint is satisfied with equality as the third term
is zero.
• Finally, when ℓ˜(i) = i (now, it is r˜(i) 6= i), we have that αi =
∑
j 6=i:r˜(j)=i γj (cancelling out
the first and fifth terms) and βi = γi ·1{r˜(i) 6= i}+
∑
j 6=i:ℓ˜(j)=i δj (cancelling out the second,
third and sixth terms), and the second constraint is satisfied with equality as the fourth term
is zero.
So, the social cost of the solution z is lower-bounded by the objective value of the primal LP
which, by duality, is lower-bounded by the objective value of the dual LP. Hence
SC(z, s) ≥
∑
i∈[n]
siαi −
∑
i∈[n]
siβi
=
1
2(k + 1)

∑
i∈[n]
|{j ∈ [n] : r˜(j) = i}|si −
∑
i∈[n]
|{j ∈ [n] : ℓ˜(j) = i}|si


=
1
2(k + 1)
∑
i∈[n]
(sr˜(i) − sℓ˜(i))
=
1
2(k + 1)
∑
i∈[n]
|sr˜(i) − sℓ˜(i)|.
The last equality follows since sr˜(i) ≥ sℓ˜(i), by the definition of r˜(i) and ℓ˜(i).
Note that for each player i, there are at least k + 1 beliefs of different players with values in
[sℓ˜(i), sr˜(i)], including player i. By the definition of ℓ
∗(i) and r∗(i) for each player i, the above
inequality yields
SC(z, s) ≥
1
2(k + 1)
∑
i∈[n]
|sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)|,
as desired.
We are now ready to prove our upper bound on the price of anarchy for k-COF games. In our
proof, we exploit the mononicity of opinions in a pure Nash equilibrium and we associate the cost
of each player in the equilibrium to the same quantity used in the statement of Lemma 11.
Theorem 12. The price of anarchy of k-COF games over pure Nash equilibria is at most 4(k+1).
Proof. Consider a k-COF game with belief vector s = (s1, . . . , sn), and let z
∗ = (z∗1 , . . . , z
∗
n) be
any opinion vector that minimizes the social cost. By Lemma 11, we have
SC(z∗, s) ≥
1
2(k + 1)
n∑
i=1
|sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)|. (7)
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Now, consider any pure Nash equilibrium z of the game. We will show that
SC(z, s) ≤ 2
n∑
i=1
|sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)|, (8)
and the theorem will then follow by inequalities (7) and (8).
The rest of this proof is, therefore, devoted to showing inequality (8). To this end, we will show
that, for any player i, we have costi(z, s) ≤ 2(sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)). Then, inequality (8) will follow by
summing over all players.
Consider an arbitrary player i and, without loss of generality, let us assume that zi ≥ si (the case
zi ≤ si is symmetric). Recall that ℓ(i) and r(i) denote the players inNi(z, s)∪{i} with the leftmost
and rightmost point, respectively, in Ii(z, s) and note that r(i) − ℓ(i) = k. First, observe that if
zr(i) = zi, the assumption zi ≥ si implies that all players inNi(z, s)∪{i} have opinions at si (since,
by Lemma 1, zi is in the middle of interval Ii(z, s) at equilibrium). In this case, costi(z, s) = 0 and
the desired inequality holds trivially. So, in the following, we assume that r(i) > i and zr(i) > zi,
i.e., zr(i) is at the right of zi which in turn is at the right of (or coincides with) si.
Recall that, for player i, ℓ∗(i) and r∗(i) denote the integers in [n] such that ℓ∗(i) ≤ i ≤ r∗(i),
r∗(i) − ℓ∗(i) = k, and |sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)| is minimized. Since r(i) − ℓ(i) = r
∗(i) − ℓ∗(i) = k, we
distinguish between two main cases depending on the relative order of r(i) and r∗(i).
Case I r(i) > r∗(i) and ℓ(i) > ℓ∗(i). Since zr(i) is at the right of si and ℓ
∗(i) does not belong to
the neighborhood of player i (while player r(i) does so by definition), zℓ∗(i) is at the left of si and,
furthermore, zr(i) − si ≤ si − zℓ∗(i) or, equivalently,
zr(i) ≤ 2si − zℓ∗(i). (9)
This yields
costi(z, s) = zr(i) − zi ≤ 2si − zℓ∗(i) − zi. (10)
These inequalities will be useful in several places of the proof for this case below.
If zℓ∗(i) ≥ sℓ∗(i) then, since r
∗(i) ≥ i and zi ≥ si, inequality (10) becomes costi(z, s) ≤
si − sℓ∗(i) ≤ sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i) and the desired inequality follows. So, in the following, we assume that
zℓ∗(i) < sℓ∗(i) i.e., zℓ∗(i) is (strictly) at the left of sℓ∗(i). Hence, ℓ
∗(i) has her leftmost neighbor with
zℓ(ℓ∗(i)) < zℓ∗(i) and, by Lemma 1,
zℓ∗(i) =
zℓ(ℓ∗(i)) +max{sℓ∗(i), zr(ℓ∗(i))}
2
. (11)
Since r∗(i) − ℓ∗(i) = k and ℓ(ℓ∗(i)) < ℓ∗(i), we have r∗(i) − ℓ(ℓ∗(i)) > k, and, therefore,
r∗(i) does not belong to the neighborhood of ℓ∗(i). Hence, sℓ∗(i) − zℓ(ℓ∗(i)) ≤ zr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i) or,
equivalently
zℓ(ℓ∗(i)) ≥ 2sℓ∗(i) − zr∗(i) ≥ 2sℓ∗(i) − 2si + zℓ∗(i), (12)
where the second inequality follows by our case assumption zr∗(i) ≤ zr(i) and inequality (9).
We now further distinguish between two cases, depending on whether player i belongs to the
neighborhood of player ℓ∗(i) or not.
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Case I.1 i ∈ Nℓ∗(i)(z, s); see also Figure 7a for an example of this case. Then, we have zi ≤
zr(ℓ∗(i)) and, subsequently,
max{sℓ∗(i), zr(ℓ∗(i))} ≥ zr(ℓ∗(i)) ≥ zi. (13)
Using inequalities (12) and (13), (11) yields
zℓ∗(i) ≥ sℓ∗(i) − si +
zℓ∗(i)
2
+
zi
2
,
which implies that zℓ∗(i) ≥ 2sℓ∗(i) − 2si + zi. Now, inequality (10) becomes
costi(z, s) ≤ 4si − 2sℓ∗(i) − 2zi ≤ 2si − 2sℓ∗(i) ≤ 2(sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i))
as desired. The second inequality follows since zi ≥ si and the last one follows since r
∗(i) ≥ i.
Case I.2 i 6∈ Nℓ∗(i)(z, s); see also Figure 7b for an example. Then, we have sℓ∗(i) − zℓ(ℓ∗(i)) ≤
zi − sℓ∗(i), which implies that zℓ(ℓ∗(i)) ≥ 2sℓ∗(i) − zi. Using this inequality together with the fact
that max{sℓ∗(i), zr(ℓ∗(i))} ≥ sℓ∗(i), (11) yields
zℓ∗(i) ≥
3sℓ∗(i) − zi
2
and inequality (10) becomes
costi(z, s) ≤ 2si −
3
2
sℓ∗(i) −
zi
2
≤
3
2
si −
3
2
sℓ∗(i) ≤ 2(sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)),
as desired. The second last inequality follows since zi ≥ si and the last one follows since r
∗(i) ≥ i.
Case II r(i) ≤ r∗(i) and ℓ(i) ≤ ℓ∗(i). Since zi is in the middle of the interval Ii(z, s) and zr(i) is
the rightmost opinion in Ii(z, s), we have
zi =
min{si, zℓ(i)}+ zr(i)
2
≤
zℓ(i) + zr(i)
2
≤
zℓ∗(i) + zr∗(i)
2
.
Since si ≤ zi, the last inequality yields
zℓ∗(i) ≥ 2si − zr∗(i). (14)
We also have
costi(z, s) = zr(i) − zi ≤ zr∗(i) − zi. (15)
If zr∗(i) ≤ sr∗(i) then, since sℓ∗(i) ≤ si ≤ zi, inequality (15) yields costi(z, s) ≤ sr∗(i) − si ≤
sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i), which is even stronger than the desired inequality. So, in the following we assume
that zr∗(i) > sr∗(i), i.e., zr∗(i) is at the right of sr∗(i). Since zr∗(i) is in the middle of the interval
Ir∗(i)(z, s), we have that r(r
∗(i)) > r∗(i) and, therefore,
zr∗(i) =
min{sr∗(i), zℓ(r∗(i))}+ zr(r∗(i))
2
. (16)
Moreover, since r(r∗(i)) − ℓ∗(i) > r∗(i) − ℓ∗(i) = k, player ℓ∗(i) does not belong to the neigh-
borhood of player r∗(i). Hence, zr(r∗(i)) − sr∗(i) ≤ sr∗(i) − zℓ∗(i) which, together with inequality
(14), yields that
zr(r∗(i)) ≤ 2sr∗(i) − zℓ∗(i) ≤ 2sr∗(i) − 2si + zr∗(i). (17)
We now further distinguish between two cases, depending on whether player i belongs to the
neighborhood of player r∗(i) or not.
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Case II.1 i ∈ Nr∗(i)(z, s); see also Figure 7c for an example. Then, using the fact that
min{sr∗(i), zℓ(r∗(i))} ≤ zℓ(r∗(i)) ≤ zi and inequality (17), equation (16) becomes
zr∗(i) ≤
zi + 2sr∗(i) − 2si + zr∗(i)
2
and, equivalently, zr∗(i) ≤ zi + 2sr∗(i) − 2si. Hence, inequality (15) yields
costi(z, s) ≤ 2sr∗(i) − 2si ≤ 2(sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)),
as desired. The last inequality follows since ℓ∗(i) ≤ i.
Case II.2 i 6∈ Nr∗(i)(z, s); see Figure 7d for an example. Since i does not belong to the neigh-
borhood of player r∗(i) but player r(r∗(i)) does, we have that zr(r∗(i)) − sr∗(i) ≤ sr∗(i) − zi or,
equivalently, zr(r∗(i)) ≤ 2sr∗(i) − zi. Then, using also the fact that min{sr∗(i), zℓ(r∗(i))} ≤ sr∗(i),
equation (16) becomes
zr∗(i) ≤
3sr∗(i) − zi
2
and (15) yields
costi(z, s) ≤
3
2
(sr∗(i) − zi) ≤
3
2
(sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)),
which is even stronger than the desired inequality. The last inequality follows since zi ≥ si and
ℓ∗(i) ≤ i.
So, we have shown that in the pure Nash equilibrium z and for any player i, we have that
costi(z, s) ≤ 2(sr∗(i) − sℓ∗(i)). By summing over all players, we obtain inequality (8) and the
theorem follows.
7. An improved bound on the price of anarchy for 1-COF games
For the case of 1-COF games we can prove an even stronger statement following a similar proof
roadmap as in the previous section, but using simpler (and shorter) arguments. We denote by η(i)
the player (other than i) that minimizes the distance |si− sη(i)|; note that η(i) ∈ {i− 1, i+1}. The
proof of the next lemma (which can be thought of as a stronger version of Lemma 11 for 1-COF
games) relies on a particular charging scheme that allows us to lower-bound the cost of each player
in any deterministic opinion vector.
Lemma 13. Consider a 1-COF game with belief vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) and let z be any deter-
ministic opinion vector. Then,
SC(z, s) ≥
1
3
n∑
i=1
|si − sη(i)|.
Proof. We begin by classifying the players into groups and, subsequently, we show how the costs of
different groups can be combined so that the lemma holds. We call a player i with zi /∈ [si−1, si+1]
a kangaroo player and associate the quantity excessi with her. If zi ∈ [sj , sj+1] for some j > i, we
say that the players in the setCi = {i+1, ..., j} are covered by player i and define excessi = zi−sj.
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zℓ(ℓ∗(i)) zℓ∗(i) sℓ∗(i) sℓ(i) si zi sr∗(i) sr(i)
Iℓ∗(i)(z, s) · · ·
(a)
zℓ(ℓ∗(i)) zℓ∗(i) sℓ∗(i) sℓ(i) si zi sr∗(i) sr(i)
Iℓ∗(i)(z, s)
(b)
sℓ(i) sℓ∗(i) si zi sr(i) sr∗(i) zr∗(i) zr(r∗(i))
Ir∗(i)(z, s)· · ·
(c)
sℓ(i) sℓ∗(i) si zi sr(i) sr∗(i) zr∗(i) zr(r∗(i))
Ir∗(i)(z, s)
(d)
Figure 7: Indicative examples of the different cases in the proof of Theorem 12. Subfigures (a) and
(b) concern Case I, as r(i) > r∗(i) and ℓ(i) > ℓ∗(i), while subfigures (c) and (d) fall under Case II,
as r(i) ≤ r∗(i) and ℓ(i) ≤ ℓ∗(i).
Otherwise, if zi ∈ [sj−1, sj ] for some j < i, we say that the players in the set Ci = {j, ..., i − 1}
are covered by player i and define excessi = sj − zi.
Let K be the set of kangaroo players and C the set of players that are covered by a kangaroo;
these need not be disjoint. We now partition the players not in K ∪ C into the set L of large players
such that, for any i ∈ L, it holds costi(z, s) ≥
1
3(|si − sη(i)|), and the set S that contains the
remaining players who we call small. See also Figure 8 for an example of these sets.
s1 s2 z1 z3 s3 z2 z4 s4 z5 s5
Figure 8: An example with kangaroos, covered, large, and small players. In particular, 1 ∈ K as
z1 /∈ [s1, s2], 2 ∈ K ∩ C as she is covered by player 1 and, in addition, z2 /∈ [s1, s3]. Similarly,
3 ∈ C as she is covered by player 2, while 4 and 5 are neither kangaroo nor covered. Since
cost4(z, s) <
1
3 (s4 − s3), it is 4 ∈ S, while, since cost5(z, s) ≥
1
3(s5 − s4), we have 5 ∈ L.
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We proceed to prove five useful properties (Claims 14–18); recall that σ(i) denotes the single
neighbor of player i.
Claim 14. Let i ∈ K. Then, costi(z, s) − excessi ≥
1
3(|si − sη(i)|+
∑
j∈Ci
|sj − sη(j)|).
Proof. We assume that zi > si (the other case is symmetric). Let ℓ be the player with the rightmost
belief that is covered by i. Then, excessi = zi − sℓ. We have
costi(z, s) − excessi = max{|si − zi|, |zi − zσ(i)|} − (zi − sℓ)
≥ sℓ − si =
ℓ−1∑
j=i
(sj+1 − sj)
≥
1
3
(|si − sη(i)|+
∑
j∈Ci
|sj − sη(j)|)
as desired.
Claim 15. Let i ∈ S such that σ(i) ∈ K. Then, costi(z, s) + excessσ(i) ≥
1
3 |si − sη(i)|.
Proof. We assume that σ(i) > i (the other case is symmetric). If zσ(i) > sσ(i), then
costi(z, s) = max{|si − zi|, |zi − zσ(i)|}
≥
1
2
(zσ(i) − si) >
1
2
(sσ(i) − si)
≥
1
3
|si − sη(i)|,
which contradicts the fact that i is a small player. Hence, zσ(i) ∈ [si, sσ(i)], otherwise player i
would be covered. Let j be the player with the leftmost belief that is covered by player σ(i). Then,
excessσ(i) = sj − zσ(i). We have
costi(z, s) + excessσ(i) = max{|si − zi|, |zi − zσ(i)|}+ sj − zσ(i)
≥
1
2
(zσ(i) − si) +
1
2
(sj − zσ(i)) =
1
2
(sj − si)
≥
1
3
|si − sη(i)|
as desired.
Claim 16. Let i ∈ S such that σ(i) ∈ L or σ(i) ∈ C \ K. Then, costi(z, s) + costσ(i)(z, s) ≥
1
3(|si − sη(i)|+ |sσ(i) − sη(σ(i))|).
Proof. We assume that σ(i) > i (the other case is symmetric). If zσ(i) > sσ(i), then
costi(z, s) = max{|si − zi|, |zi − zσ(i)|}
≥
1
2
(zσ(i) − si) >
1
2
(sσ(i) − si)
≥
1
3
|si − sη(i)|,
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which contradicts the fact that i is a small player. Hence, zσ(i) ∈ [si, sσ(i)], otherwise player i would
be covered. Then,
costi(z, s) + costσ(i)(z, s) = max{|si − zi|, |zi − zσ(i)|}+max{|sσ(i) − zσ(i)|, |zσ(i) − zσ(σ(i)) |}
≥ zσ(i) − zi + sσ(i) − zσ(i) = sσ(i) − zi.
Since i is small, we have zi < si +
1
3(sσ(i) − si) and we get
costi(z, s) + costσ(i)(z, s) ≥
2
3
(sσ(i) − si) ≥
1
3
|si − sη(i)|+
1
3
|sσ(i) − sη(σ(i))|
as desired.
Let N(S) denote the set of players j that are neighbors of players in S (i.e., j ∈ N(S) when
σ(i) = j for some player i ∈ S).
Claim 17. N(S) does not contain small players.
Proof. Assume otherwise that for some player i ∈ S, σ(i) also belongs to S. Without loss of
generality σ(i) > i. If zσ(i) ≥ sσ(i), then
costi(z, s) ≥
1
2
|zσ(i) − si| ≥
1
2
|sσ(i) − si| ≥
1
3
|si − sη(i)|
contradicting the fact that i ∈ S. So, zσ(i) < sσ(i). Also, zσ(i) ≥ si (since neither i is covered
nor σ(i) is kangaroo). Since σ(i) is small, sσ(i) − zσ(i) <
1
3 |sσ(i) − sη(σ(i))| ≤
1
3 (sσ(i) − si), i.e.,
zσ(i) >
2
3sσ(i) +
1
3si. Hence,
costi(z, s) ≥
1
2
(zσ(i) − si) >
1
3
(sσ(i) − si),
which contradicts i ∈ S.
Claim 18. For every two players i, i′ ∈ S, σ(i) 6= σ(i′).
Proof. Assume otherwise and let σ(i) = σ(i′) = j with i < i′. If zj 6∈ [si, si′ ], then the cost
of either i or i′ is at least 12(si′ − si), contradicting the fact that both players are small. Hence,
zj ∈ [si, si′ ]. Notice that sj ∈ [si, si′ ] as well, otherwise either i or i
′ would be covered by j. Now
the fact that i and i′ are small implies that
costi(z, s)+costi′(z, s) <
1
3
|si− sη(i)|+
1
3
|si′ − sη(i′)| ≤
1
3
(sj − si)+
1
3
(si′ − sj) =
1
3
(si′ − si).
On the other hand,
costi(z, s) + costi′(z, s) ≥
1
2
(zj − si) +
1
2
(si′ − zj) =
1
2
(si′ − si),
a contradiction.
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We now consider the social cost of z due to players of different groups and exploit the claims
above so that we obtain the lemma. In particular, we have
SC(z, s) =
n∑
i=1
costi(z, s)
≥
∑
i∈S:σ(i)∈K
(
costi(z, s) + excessσ(i)
)
+
∑
i∈S:σ(i)∈L∪(C\K)
(
costi(z, s) + costσ(i)(z, s)
)
+
∑
i∈K
(costi(z, s) − excessi) +
∑
i∈L\N(S)
costi(z, s)
≥
1
3
∑
i∈S:σ(i)∈K
|si − sη(i)|
+
1
3
∑
i∈S:σ(i)∈L∪(C\K)
(
|si − sη(i)|+ |sσ(i) − sη(σ(i))|
)
+
1
3
∑
i∈K

|si − sη(i)|+ ∑
j∈Ci
|sj − sη(j)|

+ 1
3
∑
i∈L\N(S)
|si − sη(i)|
≥
1
3
n∑
i=1
|si − sη(i)|,
as desired. The first inequality follows by the classification of the players and due to Claims 17 and
18. The second one follows by Claims 15, 16, and 14, and by the definition of large players. The
last one follows since the players enumerated in the first two sums at its left cover the whole set S
(by Claim 17).
We are ready to present our upper bound on the price of anarchy for 1-COF games.
Theorem 19. The price of anarchy of 1-COF games over pure Nash equilibria is at most 3.
Proof. Let us consider a 1-COF game with n players and belief vector s. Let z∗ be an optimal
opinion vector and recall that η(i) is the player that minimizes the distance |si − sη(i)|. By Lemma
13, we have
SC(z∗, s) ≥
1
3
n∑
i=1
|si − sη(i)|. (18)
Now, consider any pure Nash equilibrium z of the game. We will show that
SC(z, s) ≤
n∑
i=1
|si − sη(i)|. (19)
The theorem then follows by (18) and (19).
In particular, we will show that costi(z, s) ≤ |si − sη(i)| for each player i. Let us assume that
η(i) = i− 1; the case η(i) = i+ 1 is symmetric. Recall that σ(i) is the neighbor of player i in the
pure Nash equilibrium z. We distinguish between four cases.
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• Case I: σ(i) = i − 1. By Lemma 4, we have si−1 ≤ zi ≤ si. Then, clearly, costi(z, s) =
|si − zi| ≤ |si − si−1| as desired.
• Case II: σ(i) = i+1 and σ(i−1) = i. By Lemmas 2 and 4, we have si−1 ≤ zi−1 ≤ si ≤ zi.
Since player i has player i + 1 as neighbor, we have |zi+1 − si| ≤ |si − zi−1|. Hence,
costi(z, s) = |zi − si| ≤ |zi+1 − si| ≤ |si − zi−1| ≤ |si − si−1|.
• Case III: σ(i) = i+ 1, σ(i − 1) = i− 2, and costi(z, s) ≤ costi−1(z, s). By the definition
of σ(·) and Lemma 2, we have zi−2 ≤ zi−1 ≤ si−1 ≤ si ≤ zi ≤ zi+1. We have
costi(z, s) ≤ 2 costi−1(z, s) − costi(z, s)
= |si−1 − zi−2| − |zi − si|
≤ |zi − si−1| − |zi − si|
= |si − si−1|.
The second inequality follows since player i− 2 (instead of i) is the neighbor of player i− 1.
• Case IV: σ(i) = i+ 1, σ(i− 1) = i− 2, and costi(z, s) > costi−1(z, s).
costi(z, s) < 2 costi(z, s) − costi−1(z, s)
= |zi+1 − si| − |si−1 − zi−1|
≤ |si − zi−1| − |si−1 − zi−1|
= |si − si−1|.
The second inequality follows since player i+1 (instead of i− 1) is the neighbor of player i.
This completes the proof.
8. Lower bounds on the price of anarchy
This section contains our lower bounds on the price of anarchy. 3 We begin by considering the
simpler case of 1-COF games, for which we present a tight lower bound of 3 for pure Nash equilibria
(Theorem 20) and a lower bound of 6 for mixed Nash equilibria (Theorem 21). We remark that,
for 1-COF games, this implies that mixed Nash equilibria are strictly worse than pure ones. Then,
we study the general case of k-COF games and we show lower bounds for pure and mixed Nash
equilibria (Theorems 22 and 23, respectively) that grow linearly with k.
8.1 The case of 1-COF games
We now present our lower bounds for the case of 1-COF games; both results rely on the same, and
rather simple, instance.
Theorem 20. The price of anarchy of 1-COF games over pure Nash equilibria is at least 3.
3. We remark that our lower bounds on the price of stability in Section 4 are also lower bounds on the price of anarchy.
However, the lower bounds presented in this section are much stronger.
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−10− λ
[2]
−2− λ
[1]
2 + λ
[1]
10 + λ
[2]
(a)
−10− λ −2− λ 2 + λ 10 + λ−6− λ 6 + λ
(b)
−10− λ −2− λ 2 + λ 10 + λ−2−λ
3
2+λ
3
(c)
Figure 9: (a) The 1-COF game considered in the proofs of Theorems 20 and 21. (b) The pure Nash
equilibrium vector z (see the proof of Theorem 20) with social cost 8. (c) The opinion vector z˜ with
social cost 8+4λ3 .
Proof. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and consider a 1-COF game with six players and belief vector s = (−10 −
λ,−10− λ,−2− λ, 2 + λ, 10 + λ, 10 + λ). This game is depicted in Figure 9a. We can show that
the opinion vector (see Figure 9b)
z = (−10− λ,−10− λ,−6− λ, 6 + λ, 10 + λ, 10 + λ)
is a pure Nash equilibrium with social cost SC(z, s) = 8. The first two players suffer zero cost as
they follow each other and their opinions coincide with their beliefs; the same holds also for the last
two players. For the third player, it is σ(3) ∈ {1, 2} since |z1 − s3| = |z2 − s3| = 8 < |z4 − s3| =
8+ 2λ and z3 is in the middle of the interval [−10− λ,−2− λ]; hence, cost3(z, s) = 4. Similarly,
we have σ(4) ∈ {5, 6}, z4 lies in the middle of the interval [2 + λ, 10 + λ] and cost4(z, s) = 4.
Hence, z is indeed a pure Nash equilibrium.
Now, consider the opinion vector (see Figure 9c)
z˜ =
(
−10− λ,−10− λ,
−2− λ
3
,
2 + λ
3
, 10 + λ, 10 + λ
)
which yields a social cost of SC(z˜, s) = 8+4λ3 ; here, again, the first and last two players have zero
cost, but players 3 and 4 now each have cost 4+2λ3 since they follow each other. The optimal social
cost is upper bounded by SC(z˜) and, hence, the price of anarchy is at least
SC(z, s)
SC(z˜, s)
=
3
1 + λ/2
,
and the theorem follows by setting λ arbitrarily close to 0.
Our next theorem gives a lower bound on the price of anarchy over mixed Nash equilibria for
1-COF games; we remark that this lower bound is greater than the upper bound of Theorem 19 for
the price of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria.
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Theorem 21. The price of anarchy of 1-COF games over mixed Nash equilibria is at least 6.
Proof. Consider again the 1-COF game depicted in Figure 9a with six players and belief vector
s = (−10−λ,−10−λ,−2−λ, 2+λ, 10+λ, 10+λ), where λ ∈ (0, 1). To simplify the following
discussion, we will refer to the first two players as the L players, the third player as player ℓ, the
fourth player as player r, and the last two players as the R players.
Let z be a randomized opinion vector according to which zi = si for every i ∈ L ∪ R, zℓ is
chosen equiprobably from {−6−λ,−6+3λ}, and zr is chosen equiprobably from {6+λ, 6−3λ}.
Observe that σ(ℓ) ∈ L whenever zr = 6 + λ, and σ(ℓ) = r whenever zr = 6 − 3λ; each of these
events occurs with probability 1/2. Hence, we obtain
E[costℓ(z, s)] = E[costr(z, s)] =
1
2
(
4
2
+
4 + 4λ
2
)
+
1
2
(
12− 2λ
2
+
12− 6λ
2
)
= 8− λ,
and, thus, E[SC(z, s)] = 16−2λ. In the following, we will prove that z is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
First, observe that all players in sets L and R have no incentive to deviate since they follow each
other and have zero cost. We will now argue about player ℓ; due to symmetry, our findings will
apply to player r as well.
Consider a deterministic deviating opinion y for player ℓ. We will show that E[costℓ(z, s)] ≤
Ez−ℓ [costℓ(y, z−ℓ), s] for any y, which implies that player ℓ has no incentive to deviate from the
randomized opinion zℓ. Indeed, we have that
Ez−ℓ [costℓ((y, z−ℓ), s)]
=
1
2
max{| − 2− λ− y|, |y + 10 + λ|}+
1
2
max{| − 2− λ− y|, |6 − 3λ− y|}
≥
1
2
(y + 10 + λ) +
1
2
(6− 3λ− y)
= 8− λ,
where the inequality holds sincemax{|a|, |b|} ≥ a for any a and b. Hence, player ℓ has no incentive
to deviate from her strategy in z, and neither has player r due to symmetry. Therefore, z is a mixed
Nash equilibrium.
Now, consider the opinion vector
z˜ =
(
−10− λ,−10− λ,
−2− λ
3
,
2 + λ
3
, 10 + λ, 10 + λ
)
which, as in Theorem 20, yields a social cost of SC(z˜, s) = 8+4λ3 . Hence, the optimal social cost is
upper bounded by SC(z˜, s), and the price of anarchy over mixed equilibria is at least
E[SC(z, s)]
SC(z˜, s)
= 3
16− 2λ
8 + 4λ
,
and the theorem follows by setting λ arbitrarily close to 0.
8.2 The general case of k-COF games with k ≥ 2
We will now present lower bounds on the price of anarchy for k-COF games, with k ≥ 2. We start
with the case of pure Nash equilibria and continue with the more general case of mixed equilibria.
As in the case of 1-COF games, a particular game will be used in order to derive the lower bounds
both for pure and mixed Nash equilibria.
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−16− 2λ
[k + 1]
−4− λ
[1]
0
[k − 1]
4 + λ
[1]
16 + 2λ
[k + 1]
(a)
−16− 2λ −4− λ 0 4 + λ 16 + 2λ−8− λ 8 + λ
(b)
−16− 2λ −4− λ 0 4 + λ 16 + 2λ
(c)
−16− 2λ −4− λ 0 4 + λ 16 + 2λ−4−λ
3
4+λ
3
(d)
Figure 10: (a) The k-COF game considered in the proofs of Theorems 22 and 23, for k ≥ 2. (b)
The pure Nash equilibrium opinion vector z (see the proof of Theorem 22). (c) The optimal opinion
vector z˜ for k ≥ 3. (d) The optimal opinion vector z˜ for k = 2. Observe that the optimal opinion
vector changes at k = 2 due to the neighborhood size.
Theorem 22. The price of anarchy of k-COF games over pure Nash equilibria is at least k + 1 for
k ≥ 3, and at least 18/5 for k = 2.
Proof. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and consider a k-COF game with 3k+3 players, for k ≥ 2, that are partitioned
into the following five sets. The first set L consists of k + 1 players with si = −16 − 2λ for any
i ∈ L, the second set consists of a single player ℓ with sℓ = −4 − λ, the third set M has k − 1
players with si = 0 for any i ∈ M , the fourth set is a single player r with sr = 4 + λ, and the
last set R consists of k + 1 players with si = 16 + 2λ for any i ∈ R. This instance is depicted in
Figure 10a.
Let z be the following opinion vector: zi = −16−2λ for any i ∈ R, zℓ = −8−λ, zi = 0 for any
i ∈M , zr = 8+λ, and zi = 16+2λ for any i ∈ R; see Figure 10b. It is not hard to verify that this
opinion vector is a pure Nash equilibrium with social cost SC(z, s) = (8+λ)(k+1). First, observe
that all players in sets L and R have zero cost, and, hence, have no incentive to deviate to another
opinion. Furthermore, no player i ∈ M has an incentive to deviate either since zi lies in the middle
of the interval [−8−λ, 8+λ] which is defined by the opinions of players ℓ and r who, together with
the remaining players ofM , constitute the neighborhood Ni(z, s) of player i. The cost experienced
by such a player i is 8 + λ. Finally, the neighborhood Nℓ(z, s) of player ℓ consists of all players
inM (who have opinions that are closest to sℓ) and some player i ∈ L; note that player r does not
belong toNℓ(z, s) since zr−sℓ = 12+2λ > 12−λ = sℓ−zi for all i ∈ L. Hence, player ℓ has no
incentive to deviate to another opinion since zℓ lies in the middle of the interval [−16 − 2λ, 0] and
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she experiences cost equal to 8 + λ. Due to symmetry, player r does not have incentive to deviate
as well. Hence, z is indeed a pure Nash equilibrium with SC(z, s) = (8 + λ)(k + 1).
We now present an opinion vector z˜ with social cost SC(z˜, s) = 8 + 2λ for k ≥ 3 and
cost(z˜, s) = 53(4 + λ) for k = 2. In particular, for k ≥ 3, z˜ is defined as follows: z˜i = −16 − 2λ
for any i ∈ L, z˜ℓ = z˜i = z˜r = 0 for any i ∈ M , and z˜i = 16 + 2λ for any i ∈ R; see Figure 10c.
Observe that all players in L, M , and R have zero cost, while players ℓ and r have cost equal to
4 + λ each. For k = 2, z˜ is defined as follows: z˜i = −16 − 2λ for any i ∈ L, z˜ℓ = −
1
3(4 + λ),
z˜i = 0 for any i ∈ M , z˜r =
1
3(4 + λ), and z˜i = 16 + 2λ for any i ∈ R; see Figure 10d. Again, all
players in L and R have zero cost. However, players ℓ and r now each have cost 23(4 + λ) and the
unique player inM has cost 13 (4 + λ).
Clearly, since SC(z˜, s) is an upper bound on the optimal social cost, we conclude that the price
of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria is at least
(8+λ)(k+1)
8+2λ for k ≥ 3 and
9(8+λ)
5(4+λ) for k = 2, and the
theorem follows by setting λ arbitrarily close to 0.
We now consider the case of mixed Nash equilibria; we remark that, in this case, our lower
bounds for k ≥ 2 are smaller than the corresponding upper bounds for pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 23. The price of anarchy of k-COF games over mixed Nash equilibria is at least k + 2
for k ≥ 3, and at least 24/5 for k = 2.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 22, let λ ∈ (0, 1) and consider the k-COF game depicted in
Figure 10a with 3k + 3 players that form 5 sets. Again, the first set L consists of k + 1 players
where si = −16 − 2λ for all i ∈ L, the second set consists of a single player ℓ with sℓ = −4− λ,
the third set M has k − 1 players with si = 0 for all i ∈ M , the fourth set is a single player r with
sr = 4 + λ, and the last set R consists of k + 1 players with si = 16 + 2λ for all i ∈ R.
Consider the following (randomized) opinion vector z: zi = si for every i ∈ L∪M ∪R, while
zℓ is chosen uniformly at random among {−8− λ,−8+ 3λ} and zr is chosen uniformly at random
among {8 − 3λ, 8 + λ}. We will show that the opinion vector z is a mixed Nash equilibrium with
E[SC(z, s)] = 8k + 16− λ.
First, observe that the players in sets L and the R constitute local neighborhoods, that is,
Ni(z, s) = L \ {i} for any player i ∈ L, and Ni(z, s) = R \ {i} for any player i ∈ R. Hence, all
these players have zero cost and no incentive to deviate.
Next, let us focus on a player i ∈ M . Clearly, the neighborhood of player i consists of the
remaining k − 2 players in M as well as players ℓ and r. The expected cost of player i in z is
E[costi(z, s)] =
3
4 (8+ λ) +
1
4(8− 3λ) = 8 since at least one of players ℓ and r is at distance 8+ λ
with probability 3/4 and both of them are at distance 8 − 3λ with probability 1/4. Hence, these
k−1 players contribute 8(k−1) to the expected social cost of z. We now argue that if player i ∈M
deviates to a deterministic opinion y, her expected cost does not decrease. Clearly, if y ≥ 3λ, then
this trivially holds as the expected cost of i is at least y − zℓ which is at least y + 8− 3λ; the case
where y ≤ −3λ is symmetric. Hence, it suffices to consider the case where |y| < 3λ. The expected
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cost of i when deviating to y is
Ez−i [costi((y, z−i), s)]
=
1
4
max{8 + λ− y, y + 8 + λ}+
1
4
max{8 + λ− y, y + 8− 3λ}
+
1
4
max{8− 3λ− y, y + 8 + λ}+
1
4
max{8− 3λ− y, y + 8− 3λ}
≥
1
4
(8 + λ− y) +
1
4
(8 + λ− y) +
1
4
(y + 8 + λ) +
1
4
(y + 8− 3λ)
= 8,
where the inequality holds since max{a, b} ≥ a for any a and b.
Now, let us examine player r; the case of player ℓ is symmetric. Observe that the k − 1 players
in M always belong to the neighborhood Nr(z, s) of player r and it remains to argue about the
identity of the last player in Nr(z, s). Whenever zℓ = −8 + 3λ, then ℓ ∈ Nr(z, s), otherwise, if
zℓ = −8 − λ, one of the players in set R belongs to Nr(z, s). The expected cost of player r is
E[costr(z, s)] =
1
4(8+λ)+
1
4(8+5λ)+
1
4 (16−2λ)+
1
4(16−6λ) = 12−λ/2, and, hence, players
ℓ and r contribute 24 − λ to the expected social cost of z. It remains to show that player r cannot
decrease her expected cost by deviating to another opinion y. The expected cost of player r when
deviating to y is
Ez−r [costr((y, z−r), s)] =
1
2
max{|16 + 2λ− y|, |y|}+
1
2
max{|y + 8− 3λ|, |4 + λ− y|}
≥
1
2
(16 + 2λ− y) +
1
2
(y + 8− 3λ)
= 12− λ/2,
where the inequality holds since max{|a|, |b|} ≥ a for any a and b. Hence, we conclude that z is a
mixed Nash equilibrium with expected social cost E[SC(z, s)] = 8k + 16− λ.
As in the proof of Theorem 22, there exists an opinion vector z˜ with social cost SC(z˜, s) =
8 + 2λ for k ≥ 3 and SC(z˜, s) = 53(4 + λ) for k = 2. Since SC(z˜, s) is an upper bound on the
optimal social cost, we have that the price of anarchy over mixed equilibria is at least 8k+16−λ8+2λ for
k ≥ 3 and 3(32−λ)5(4+λ) for k = 2, and the theorem follows, again by setting λ arbitrarily close to 0.
9. Open problems and extensions
We have introduced the class of compromising opinion formation games by enriching coevolution-
ary opinion games with a cost function that urges players to “meet halfway”. Our findings indicate
that the quality of their equilibria grows linearly with the neighborhood size k. Still, there exists a
gap between our lower and upper bounds for k ≥ 2 and closing this gap is a challenging technical
task. Furthermore, we know that mixed equilibria are strictly worse for 1-COF games but we have
been unable to prove upper bounds on their price of anarchy. Is their price of anarchy still linear?
Another natural question is about the complexity of pure Nash equilibria in k-COF games for
k ≥ 2. We conjecture that there exists a polynomial time algorithm for computing them, but finding
such an algorithm remains elusive. Similarly, what is the complexity of computing an optimal
opinion vector (even for k = 1)?
33
Finally, our modeling assumption that the number of neighbors is the same for all players is
rather restrictive. Extending our results to the general case of different neighborhood size per
player deserves investigation. One possible such generalization is to combine our approach to the
Hegselmann-Krause model, i.e., each player’s neighborhood consists solely of those players with
opinions sufficiently close to her belief.
References
Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, Jon M. Kleinberg, E´va Tardos, TomWexler, and Tim Rough-
garden. The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. SIAM Journal on
Computing, 38(4):1602–1623, 2008.
Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli, Clemente Galdi, and Giuseppe Persiano.
Minority becomes majority in social networks. In Proceedings of the 11th International Confer-
ence on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), pages 74–88, 2015.
Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli, Clemente Galdi, and Giuseppe Persiano.
Generalized discrete preference games. In Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 53–59, 2016.
Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli, Clemente Galdi, and Giuseppe Persiano.
Robustness in discrete preference games. In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous
Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1314–1322, 2017a.
Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli, Clemente Galdi, and Giuseppe Persiano.
Information retention in heterogeneous majority dynamics. In Proceedings of the 13th Interna-
tional Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), pages 30–43, 2017b.
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Sreenivas Gollapudi, and Kamesh Munagala. Coevolutionary opinion forma-
tion games. In Proceedings of the 45th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC),
pages 41–50, 2013.
Vittorio Bilo`, Angelo Fanelli, and Luca Moscardelli. Opinion formation games with dynamic social
influences. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
(WINE), pages 444–458, 2016.
David Bindel, Jon M. Kleinberg, and Sigal Oren. How bad is forming your own opinion? Games
and Economic Behavior, 92:248–265, 2015.
Bernard Chazelle. Natural algorithms and influence systems. Communications of the ACM, 55(12):
101–110, 2012.
Flavio Chierichetti, Jon M. Kleinberg, and Sigal Oren. On discrete preferences and coordination.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 93:11–29, 2018.
Abhimanyu Das, Sreenivas Gollapudi, and Kamesh Munagala. Modeling opinion dynamics in
social networks. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM International Conference on Web Search and
Data Mining (WSDM), pages 403–412, 2014.
34
Morris H. DeGroot. Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69
(345):118–121, 1974.
Seyed Rasoul Etesami and Tamer Basar. Game-theoretic analysis of the Hegselmann-Krause model
for opinion dynamics in finite dimensions. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 60(7):
1886–1897, 2015.
Diodato Ferraioli and Carmine Ventre. Social pressure in opinion games. In Proceedings of the
Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 3661–3667,
2017.
Diodato Ferraioli, PaulW. Goldberg, and Carmine Ventre. Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion
games. Theoretical Computer Science, 648:96–115, 2016.
Dimitris Fotakis, Dimitris Palyvos-Giannas, and Stratis Skoulakis. Opinion dynamics with local
interactions. In Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI), pages 279–285, 2016.
Noah E. Friedkin and Eugene C. Johnsen. Social influence and opinions. Journal of Mathematical
Sociology, 15(3-4):193–205, 1990.
Manuel Gomez-Rodriguez, Jure Leskovec, and Andreas Krause. Inferring networks of diffusion
and influence. ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data, 5(4):21:1–21:37, 2012.
Rainer Hegselmann and Ulrich Krause. Opinion dynamics and bounded confidence models, analy-
sis, and simulation. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 5(3), 2002.
Petter Holme and M. E. J. Newman. Nonequilibrium phase transition in the coevolution of networks
and opinions. Physical Review E, 74, 2006.
Peng Jia, Anahita MirTabatabaei, Noah E. Friedkin, and Francesco Bullo. Opinion dynamics and
the evolution of social power in influence networks. SIAM Review, 57(3):367–397, 2015.
David Kempe, Jon M. Kleinberg, and E´va Tardos. Maximizing the spread of influence through a
social network. Theory of Computing, 11:105–147, 2015.
David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, and Aleksandrs Slivkins. Selection and influence in
cultural dynamics. Network Science, 4(1):1–27, 2016.
Elias Koutsoupias and Christos H. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In Proceedings of the 16th
Annual Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), pages 404–413, 1999.
Elchanan Mossel and Omer Tamuz. Opinion exchange dynamics. arXiv:1401.4770, 2014.
Alex Olshevsky and John N. Tsitsiklis. Convergence speed in distributed consensus and averaging.
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 48(1):33–55, 2009.
Nicolas Schwind, Katsumi Inoue, Gauvain Bourgne, Se´bastien Konieczny, and Pierre Marquis.
Belief revision games. In Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI), pages 1590–1596, 2015.
35
Alan Tsang and Kate Larson. Opinion dynamics of skeptical agents. In Proceedings of the 13th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 277–
284, 2014.
Zhi Xu, Ji Liu, and Tamer Basar. On a modified DeGroot-Friedkin model of opinion dynamics. In
Proceedings of the 2015 American Control Conference (ACC), pages 1047–1052, 2015.
36
